Among other changes adopted by Virginia's General Assembly last session, the scope of coverage of the Virginia Public Procurement Act has been expanded to include the various "independent agencies" in Virginia. Currently, those independent agencies include the Virginia State Corporation Commission, the State Lottery Department, the Virginia
College Savings Plan, the Virginia Retirement System, the Virginia Worker’s
Compensation Commission, and the Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy. Presumably those independent agencies will be evaluating and adopting implementation plans, and their inclusion within the VPPA will help provide guidelines and clarity in the implication of procurement process and administration. The adopting bill was SB 1371. Below is a link to the legislation:
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?151+sum+SB1371
Your place to discuss the latest in Virginia construction law news and notes about the industry; both commercial and government construction.
VB CGC Practice Group
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Monday, May 18, 2015
Monday, May 11, 2015
VB's Mike Sterling Part of PPP Live Webcast Speaker Team - Thursday, June 18, 2015 @ 12pm - 2pm (ET)
VB is pleased to announce that one of our Construction and Government Contracts Team Members, Mike Sterling, is one of the speakers at the upcoming Live Webcast discussing Payments-Based Public-Private Partnerships on Thursday, June 18, 2015 from 12pm to 2pm. Below is more information about the program:
Monday, March 30, 2015
Pre-contract Bond, Contract or Mechanic's Lien Claim Waivers Nearing Statutory Extinction in Virginia
Virginia Governor McAuliffe proposed amendments on March 27, 2015 to Senate Bill 891S2 relating to lower tier claim rights, and their waiver.
First, he's proposed adding a new provision in Title 11, dealing with contracts generally, to add a new code section, Code Section 11-4.1:1, to void pre-waivers of payment bond claims and contract claims executed prior to providing any labor, services, or materials.
Second, he's proposed a similar pre-provision waiver of mechanic's lien rights to Code Section 43-3 that further, similarly, voids any such pre-waivers executed prior to providing any labor, services or materials.
Below is a link to the current proposed amendments of the Governor:
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?151+ful+SB891S2+pdf
Whether there is an intended distinction between the "in advance" and "prior to" language various used, as well as other interpretive aspects to the pre-waiver limitations, such as implications upon other contract payment terms, will remain to be seen if, as expected, the amendments are adopted to law.
First, he's proposed adding a new provision in Title 11, dealing with contracts generally, to add a new code section, Code Section 11-4.1:1, to void pre-waivers of payment bond claims and contract claims executed prior to providing any labor, services, or materials.
Second, he's proposed a similar pre-provision waiver of mechanic's lien rights to Code Section 43-3 that further, similarly, voids any such pre-waivers executed prior to providing any labor, services or materials.
Below is a link to the current proposed amendments of the Governor:
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?151+ful+SB891S2+pdf
Whether there is an intended distinction between the "in advance" and "prior to" language various used, as well as other interpretive aspects to the pre-waiver limitations, such as implications upon other contract payment terms, will remain to be seen if, as expected, the amendments are adopted to law.
Monday, January 19, 2015
Teaming Agreement: Richmond Circuit Court Concludes More than Mere Agreement to Try and Agree
Teaming agreements are regularly used for collaborative bids or proposals. A significant related issues has increasingly been the enforceability of the teaming agreement, and in particular whether it is merely an agreement to try and agree or whether it creates an obligatory requirement to contract if the team successfully obtains award. Judge Hughes of the Richmond Circuit Court recently considered related questions in the context of a suit by a scorned teaming subcontractor. As framed by Judge Hughes, the lead question for him on summary judgment was whether the teaming agreement was merely an agreement to agree.
Defendant's main contentions for the proposition were 1): no duration for the prospective subcontract was set in the teaming agreement; 2) the plaintiff subcontractor was not a Local Small Business or Local Small Business Enterprises as called for in the teaming agreement; and 3) the teaming agreement included a provision that provided: "Nothing herein shall be deemed to create a presumption that the parties have agreed to exclusively respond with the other." Noting the case was before him on summary judgment, Judge Hughes rejected all three arguments.
Regarding the first, he held that the subcontract duration could be implied; that is, duration would be tied to the nature of the teaming prime's contract with the owner - or, as he noted in his opinion, "In other words, the duration of the parties' sub-contractual undertaking will be determined by the length of defendant's general contract."
Regarding the second, he held that, based on the wording of the LSB / LSBE requirement in the teaming agreement (e.g., "throughout the term of the Contract"), the compliance requirement did not arise until when and if the parties themselves contracted, and so the LSB / LSBE requirement did not come into play until the underlying contract itself came into play; and so the team subcontractor's not meting those requirements for the teaming agreement was not fatal.
Finally, regarding the third, he held that the provision relied upon merely expressed the parties' agreement that the teaming agreement did not create any presumptions, and that nothing about the provision excluded the existence of a contractual relationship as alleged in the complaint; only that exclusivity existed between those parties relating to the project.
In ruling on the summary judgment motion, Judge Hughes noted that the enforceability of the teaming subcontract would be subject to later proof; however, he concluded the defendant's arguments were insufficient, as argued, for him to grant summary judgment and preclude the scorned subcontractor from presenting that proof. This is a helpful case for teaming agreement drafters, or litigators; although the outcome seems strongly tied - as are all of these cases - to the wording of the particular teaming agreement.
Defendant's main contentions for the proposition were 1): no duration for the prospective subcontract was set in the teaming agreement; 2) the plaintiff subcontractor was not a Local Small Business or Local Small Business Enterprises as called for in the teaming agreement; and 3) the teaming agreement included a provision that provided: "Nothing herein shall be deemed to create a presumption that the parties have agreed to exclusively respond with the other." Noting the case was before him on summary judgment, Judge Hughes rejected all three arguments.
Regarding the first, he held that the subcontract duration could be implied; that is, duration would be tied to the nature of the teaming prime's contract with the owner - or, as he noted in his opinion, "In other words, the duration of the parties' sub-contractual undertaking will be determined by the length of defendant's general contract."
Regarding the second, he held that, based on the wording of the LSB / LSBE requirement in the teaming agreement (e.g., "throughout the term of the Contract"), the compliance requirement did not arise until when and if the parties themselves contracted, and so the LSB / LSBE requirement did not come into play until the underlying contract itself came into play; and so the team subcontractor's not meting those requirements for the teaming agreement was not fatal.
Finally, regarding the third, he held that the provision relied upon merely expressed the parties' agreement that the teaming agreement did not create any presumptions, and that nothing about the provision excluded the existence of a contractual relationship as alleged in the complaint; only that exclusivity existed between those parties relating to the project.
In ruling on the summary judgment motion, Judge Hughes noted that the enforceability of the teaming subcontract would be subject to later proof; however, he concluded the defendant's arguments were insufficient, as argued, for him to grant summary judgment and preclude the scorned subcontractor from presenting that proof. This is a helpful case for teaming agreement drafters, or litigators; although the outcome seems strongly tied - as are all of these cases - to the wording of the particular teaming agreement.
Wednesday, January 14, 2015
FOURTH CIRCUIT CLARIFIES FEDERAL FALSE CLAIMS STANDARDS IN JANUARY 2015 MAJORITY DECISION
Last month the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (which has Federal Court appellate
jurisdiction for Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, West Virginia,
Maryland and the District of Columbia) clarified a number of aspects of Federal
False Claim actions. The case is United
States, et al. v. Triple Canopy, Inc., Nos. 13-2190 and 13-2191, decided
January 8, 2015, and involves a whistleblower (“qui tam”) claim by an ex-employee of a security contractor, Triple
Canopy, respecting Triple Canopy security service contracts with the Federal
Government.
The whistleblower, a medic named Omar Badr, claimed that
Triple Canopy had knowingly provided non-qualified guards, asked him to falsify
related records, and then when he refused falsified them and invoiced for the non-conforming
services. The Attorney General elected to intervene and proceed with the action
after it was filed by Badr, and then filed an amended complaint alleging
additional violations, and bringing several common law claims against Triple
Canopy. The district court dismissed the False Claims Act claims and common law
claims, as well as the whistleblower’s claims, and the appeal resulted.
Reviewing the district court’s decisions “de novo” (anew;
the applicable review standard), the Fourth Circuit reversed several aspects of
the district court’s decision, and in the process clarified the pleading (and
proof) standards applicable to False Claims Act (“FCA”) actions. Particularly
of note as being clarified by the court are the following:
-
Implied Certifications: The Fourth
Circuit clarified that false claims
include falsehoods by silence, and that such “implied” certifications (as
opposed to affirmative representations) arise when the contractor’s silence infers
the contractor has met contractual prerequisites for the Government action
being induced (in that case, the prerequisites for payment). The court
clarified that the silence must go to a “material” (as opposed to minor) contractual
requirement though; in that case the non-qualification of the guards being held
as material by the court.
-
Whistleblower as Plaintiff: The Fourth
Circuit clarified that the whistleblower
remains a proper party plaintiff claimant even after the Attorney General
elects to intervene and proceed with the action. The district court had
held that the whistleblower’s claims were superseded by the Government’s
claims; but the Fourth Circuit reversed holding the whistleblower had the right
to continue as a party in the action subject to the limitations in FCA Code
Sec. 3730(c)(2); which the court noted the district court was free to consider
on remand.
-
False Records Claim Basis: The Fourth
Circuit clarified that the Government was
not required to have actually reviewed or relied upon the false record to
support a false records claim. The district court had focused on the actual
effect of the false statement rather than its potential effect, but the Fourth
Circuit held that – in appropriate circumstances – a record is false if it has
the potential to influence Government
payment; even if the Government ultimately did not review the record. Additionally,
the court expressly declined to adopt the view that such implied
representations can only give rise to FCA claims when the condition is
expressly designated as a condition for payment; but that not every part of the
contract can be assumed as a condition of payment – leaving the question of
materiality for case by case analysis.
As part of its analysis, the court noted the importance of
construing the FCA as a “strong remedy” when one was needed to confront fraud
upon the government. While noting that its decisions in Triple Canopy might be
“prone to abuse” by efforts to turn minor contractual violations into FCA
claims, the court noted the FCA purposes overrode that concern and further
noted the available remedies for any such “abusive litigation.”
How the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Triple Canopy expands FCA
claims, and whistleblower actions in particular, remains to be seen; but it clearly
seems to widen the door of FCA action-ability, and should serve as a caution to
any Federal contractor respecting both what is said, and not said, to the
Government throughout contractual performance.
Tuesday, November 11, 2014
Thanks to All Veterans!
On this Veteran's Day 2014, Vandeventer Black LLP offers its thanks and gratitude to al of our veterans. Our lawyers have a solid history of military service, and we honor all how have and are serving in the different branches of service.
Wednesday, October 22, 2014
Virginia Mechanic's Liens - Deadline Overview
Below is a copy of a "cheat sheet" summary of important deadlines relating to Virginia mechanic's liens John Lockard and I prepared for a recent talk. Obviously not intended as a complete overview of mechanic's lien law, times or requirements; but a simple "keep in mind" overview.
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